Opportunity Seldom Knocks Twice: Influencing China’s Trajectory via Influencing China’s Trajectory via Defend Forward and Persistent Engagement Defend Forward and Persistent Engagement in Cyberspace
Michael P. Fischerkeller
asia policy, volume 15, number 4 (october 2020), 65–89
Great paper on an important topic - I have some minor quibbles about the final section of suggestions, but the history section and legal analysis is a must read.
Who Hath Measured the (Proving) Ground: Variation in Offensive Capabilities Test and Evaluation
JD Work
https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/p92tn/
A
There was some stuff in here I didn't know about how history played out (i.e. this is a paper where public facts get reinterpreted in a way that surprises you).
Achieving Systemic Resilience in a Great Systems Conflict Era
It has some good stuff in it, and an important recalibration, but I don't feel like it actually adapted its own recalibration or properly absorbed what the implications were.
Offensive Cyber Operations and Future Littoral Operating Concepts
JD Work
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/mca/vol5/iss1/3/
A
I need to do a second big readthrough but the argument is this: Lots of 0day exists in the systems people rely on for military operations. Finding and using this 0day is possible over long time periods. This can produce important military effects on the battlefield. When you don't see effects happening , it can be mean several things - one of which is that you didn't prepare properly and one is that you didn't see it. (Came out the day that USUKEU announced the russian attack on VIASAT)
Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities to Conventional and Strategic Deterrence
What would the US do, to help lower this risk? (https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/04/08/china-u.s.-cyber-nuclear-c3-stability-pub-84182) . Missing from this paper is NEGOTIATING WITH OUR ADVERSARIES. Other than that, it's a good TODO sheet of stuff we ought to do, but without the costs, or even a rough order of magnitude of the costs?
The Escalation Inversion and Other Oddities of Situational Cyber Stability
Also at: http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/10962. This paper has SO MANY ISSUES. I could go on and on, and I did, in a twitter thread, which I should make a video out of. It feels like a huge attempt to justify a push-back on the concept of persistent engagement in favor of some sort of vague theory of defensive alignment and restraint that is never going to gain any ground. Two major arguments against this paper: 1. Geopolitical differences between countries make it impossible to have a generic understanding of escalation in the way this model requires. 2. Nations use hybrid approachs to conflict (i.e. cyber+mil+econ) that make this model impossible to detangle.
Countering cyber proliferation: Zeroing in on Access-as-a-Service
Winnona DeSombre, James Shires, JD Work, Robert Morgus, Patrick Howell O’Neill, Luca Allodi, and Trey Herr
Got docked points for " Cyber persistence posits that actors have the capacity to manage the degree of covertness of an operation. Yet a successful compromise always requires a clandestine approach. Covert operations obscure the origins of an operation but not the activity itself, while clandestine operations strive to obscure both the origins and the activity."
It's good to point out from this paper an example of overbroad abstractions (nearly everything is a "PCI") here. Also, I find it funny she used the acronym PCI. But regardless, when trying to work on the model of deterrence in cyber this is the kind of horrible knots you will tie yourself into. Nearly everything in this paper is wrong but that itself is interesting, in a way. What would have improved this paper is a massive change of scope and focus. It needed to drill down into the weeds on some things. In particular, a rewrite of this paper JUST LOOKING AT TIANFU CUP/PWNTOOWN would potentially be useful.
Initiative Persistence as the Central Approach for U.S. Cyber Strategy
Makes a very good case that people should really stop attempting "Strategic Ambiguity". To be honest, does a GREAT job of hitting OTHER perspectives, but gets docked a point for not having enough time on its own initiative persistence work itself.
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