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Graded Cyber Policy Papers

A collection of studies about cyber security in military and civilian context.

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PaperAuthorLinkGradeDA CommentsReview LinksADD YOURSELF HERE
Current International Law Is Not an Adequate Regime for CyberspaceMichael P. FischerkellerMichael P. FischerkellerANeeds diagrams, otherwise great.
Pathologies of obfuscation: Nobody understands cyber operations or wargamingNina Kollars and Benjamin Schechterhttps://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/pathologies-of-obfuscation-nobody-understands-cyber-operations-or-wargaming/A
The Cyber Paradigm ShiftEmily Goldmanhttps://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=usnwc-newport-papers.AEssentially a prequel to the Fischerkeller paper
Rapid capabilities generation and prompt effects in offensive cyber operationsJD WorkTechnology and The Cyber Domain: Implications for Intelligence. International Studies Association Annual Conference. Las Vegas. April 2021.AExplains the ops against bot networks from USCC
Successful counter-cyber operations secure US electionJD WorkJanes Intelligence Review | March 2021APoints out a subtle area of PE in terms of judging success and failure...
Early intelligence assessments of COMBLOC computingJD WorkJD Work (2021) Early intelligence assessments of COMBLOC computing, Journal of Intelligence History, DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2021.1884791AVery much worth a read. Not just about the past.
From cold to cyber warriors: the origins and expansion of NSA’s Tailored Access Operations (TAO) to Shadow BrokersSteven Loleskihttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2018.1532627?journalCode=fint20A
DECONSTRUCTING THE U.S. POLICY OF INDICTING MALICIOUS STATE CYBER ACTORSPETER G. MACHTIGERhttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3799284A
Opportunity Seldom Knocks Twice: Influencing China’s Trajectory via Influencing China’s Trajectory via Defend Forward and Persistent Engagement Defend Forward and Persistent Engagement in CyberspaceMichael P. Fischerkellerasia policy, volume 15, number 4 (october 2020), 65–89Ahttps://cybersecpolitics.blogspot.com/2020/11/a-second-byte-at-china-apple.html
Cyber Competition to Cybered ConflictChris Demchakhttps://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=usnwc-newport-papersAhttps://twitter.com/daveaitel/status/1347612121677377538?s=20
China's Counter-Strategy to American Export Controls in Integrated CircuitsDouglas B. Fullerhttps://www.prcleader.org/fullerA
Troubled vision: Understanding recent Israeli–Iranian offensive cyber exchangesJD Work, Richard Harknetthttps://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/troubled-vision-understanding-israeli-iranian-offensive-cyber-exchanges/ABest starter paper on PE
Zero Days, Thousands of Nights: The Life and Times of Zero-Day Vulnerabilities and Their ExploitsLillian Ablon, Andy Bogarthttps://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1751.htmlAOnly paper with any data on this subject
Public attribution of cyber intrusionsFlorian J Egloffdoi: 10.1093/cybsec/tyaa012A
Secrecy's EndOona A. Hathawayhttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3852303AGreat paper on an important topic - I have some minor quibbles about the final section of suggestions, but the history section and legal analysis is a must read.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cP-RSBAI_wc&ab_channel=DaveAitelDaveAitel
Who Hath Measured the (Proving) Ground: Variation in Offensive Capabilities Test and EvaluationJD Workhttps://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/p92tn/AThere was some stuff in here I didn't know about how history played out (i.e. this is a paper where public facts get reinterpreted in a way that surprises you).
Achieving Systemic Resilience in a Great Systems Conflict EraChris Demchakhttps://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/2021_spring_cdr/COVID_CDR_V6N2_Spring_2021_r4.pdfBIt has some good stuff in it, and an important recalibration, but I don't feel like it actually adapted its own recalibration or properly absorbed what the implications were.https://twitter.com/daveaitel/status/1395136883668180992 , https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ODwuB9Zu2KI&t=1s&ab_channel=DaveAitel
Offensive Cyber Operations and Future Littoral Operating ConceptsJD Workhttps://digitalcommons.usf.edu/mca/vol5/iss1/3/AI need to do a second big readthrough but the argument is this: Lots of 0day exists in the systems people rely on for military operations. Finding and using this 0day is possible over long time periods. This can produce important military effects on the battlefield. When you don't see effects happening , it can be mean several things - one of which is that you didn't prepare properly and one is that you didn't see it. (Came out the day that USUKEU announced the russian attack on VIASAT)
Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities to Conventional and Strategic DeterrenceMark Montgomery and Erica Borghardhttps://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-102/JFQ_102.pdfBWhat would the US do, to help lower this risk? (https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/04/08/china-u.s.-cyber-nuclear-c3-stability-pub-84182) . Missing from this paper is NEGOTIATING WITH OUR ADVERSARIES. Other than that, it's a good TODO sheet of stuff we ought to do, but without the costs, or even a rough order of magnitude of the costs?
The Escalation Inversion and Other Oddities of Situational Cyber StabilityJason Healey, Robert Jervishttps://tnsr.org/2020/09/the-escalation-inversion-and-other-oddities-of-situational-cyber-stability/CAlso at: http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/10962. This paper has SO MANY ISSUES. I could go on and on, and I did, in a twitter thread, which I should make a video out of. It feels like a huge attempt to justify a push-back on the concept of persistent engagement in favor of some sort of vague theory of defensive alignment and restraint that is never going to gain any ground. Two major arguments against this paper: 1. Geopolitical differences between countries make it impossible to have a generic understanding of escalation in the way this model requires. 2. Nations use hybrid approachs to conflict (i.e. cyber+mil+econ) that make this model impossible to detangle.
Countering cyber proliferation: Zeroing in on Access-as-a-ServiceWinnona DeSombre, James Shires, JD Work, Robert Morgus, Patrick Howell O’Neill, Luca Allodi, and Trey Herrhttps://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/countering-cyber-proliferation-zeroing-in-on-access-as-a-service/CRecommendations very bad, but ENFER bit and framing are great.https://youtu.be/Qr-4_fWFpqA
Persistent Engagement Neglects Secrecy at Its PerilLennart Maschmeyerhttps://www.lawfareblog.com/persistent-engagement-neglects-secrecy-its-perilDGot docked points for " Cyber persistence posits that actors have the capacity to manage the degree of covertness of an operation. Yet a successful compromise always requires a clandestine approach. Covert operations obscure the origins of an operation but not the activity itself, while clandestine operations strive to obscure both the origins and the activity."https://twitter.com/daveaitel/status/1311474050582163457
Virtual Territorial Integrity: The Next International NormMichael J. Mazarrhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2020.1792100?journalCode=tsur20#:~:text=The%20rising%20potential%20for%20dangerous,traditional%20aggression%20toward%20other%20societies.DIt's hard to see how this concept goes forward, to be honest.
Restraint under conditions of uncertainty: Why the United States tolerates cyberattacksMonica Kaminskahttps://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/7/1/tyab008/6162971?searchresult=1FExtremely frustrating.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wNzgrzL9J6c&t=11s&ab_channel=DaveAitel
Taking Stock: Estimating Vulnerability RediscoveryTrey Herr, Bruce Schneierhttps://privpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2928758FMisunderstood data. Do not cite.
PrEP: A Framework for Malware & Cyber WeaponsTrey Herrhttps://privpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343798FOversimplified model
Deterrence in the Cyber Realm: Public versus Private Cyber CapacityNADIYA KOSTYUKhttps://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqab039/6287900?redirectedFrom=PDFFIt's good to point out from this paper an example of overbroad abstractions (nearly everything is a "PCI") here. Also, I find it funny she used the acronym PCI. But regardless, when trying to work on the model of deterrence in cyber this is the kind of horrible knots you will tie yourself into. Nearly everything in this paper is wrong but that itself is interesting, in a way. What would have improved this paper is a massive change of scope and focus. It needed to drill down into the weeds on some things. In particular, a rewrite of this paper JUST LOOKING AT TIANFU CUP/PWNTOOWN would potentially be useful.
Initiative Persistence as the Central Approach for U.S. Cyber StrategyMichael P. Fischerkeller, Richard J. Harknetthttps://docs.google.com/document/d/1SC_e3RnN8AIHNgzJFfCEXdb_44rmL9dgI7G8dB_gjNk/edit?usp=sharingBMakes a very good case that people should really stop attempting "Strategic Ambiguity". To be honest, does a GREAT job of hitting OTHER perspectives, but gets docked a point for not having enough time on its own initiative persistence work itself.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q-XoRdsfjBc&t=101s&ab_channel=DaveAitel
Deterrence by Denial in cyberspaceErica D. Borghard & Shawn W. Lonerganhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2021.1944856?src=&journalCode=fjss20CA counterpoint to the Fischerkeller paper above.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q-XoRdsfjBc&t=101s&ab_channel=DaveAitel
Keep your problems at home: the Brexit incidence on E.U. cybercommand against U.S.Grégoire De La Salle, Jan Kunen, Coralie Pattonhttps://docs.google.com/document/d/3MC_d3AnD6AIUwuJFfCBXdb_4rcL9dgI7G8dB_gjNk/D

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